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Chapter 4
The place of constructions
Konrad Szcześniak
University of Silesia, Katowice 
Palacký University, Olomouc
This study focuses on the question of the internal organization of the lexicon. In 
recent years, some cognitive linguists have considered the hypothesis that language 
forms are essentially independent of each other, thus questioning the widely ac-
cepted assumption of mental links between cognates or between constructions 
and their typical usage instances. The present study approaches this question on 
the basis of a grammatical construction (so-called Characteristic-As-Place con-
struction) which can be considered a classic case in point: apart from a general 
schematic pattern, the construction is also associated with a number of concrete 
expressions built around the construction’s pattern. It will be argued that it makes 
sense to postulate some kind of mental relations between the construction’s fixed 
manifestations and its schematic formula. Without such relations it would be, 
among other things, difficult to account for innovative usage of the construction.
Key words: grammatical constructions, constructicon, mental representations, 
derivational relations, chunking
4.1 Language conceptualized as a place
In their attempts to describe its nature, various theoretical models cannot help 
but portray language as a place or an object that takes up physical space. This 
view is evident in the title of Jackendoff’s (1997) Architecture of the Language 
Faculty. The Language is a Place metaphor is also exploited in Wittgenstein’s 
(1922/1974: 20) statement “the boundaries of language (the only language I 
understand) indicate the boundaries of my world”. Similarly in Lakoff and 
Johnson’s (1980) Conceptual Metaphor Theory, concepts in one domain are 
mapped onto concepts in another domain, as if the two domains—and by exten-
sion, language which operates on them—represented physical areas. To take one 
more example, in the context of evolutionary psychology, scholars talk about the 
“language faculty, like other biological systems showing signs of complex adap-
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tive design” (Jackendoff & Pinker 2005: 204) and in general discuss “language 
design features”, a clear mental shortcut which involves looking at language as 
if it were a building or artifact designed by the blind watchmaker of natural 
selection (Dawkins 1986).
While there are obvious limits to metaphoric modeling, there is a sense that 
viewing language as a sort of concrete place is not too far from the truth. After 
all, language is subserved by actual brain areas, and various scholars work under 
Chomsky’s (1988: 60) assumption that “The language faculty is a component 
of the mind/brain, part of the human biological endowment”. It has become 
customary to refer to linguistic knowledge (and the neural circuits behind it) 
as “the language faculty” or as The Language Organ, the title of Anderson and 
Lightfoot’s (2002) book. Thus research in neurolinguistics and psycholinguistics 
examines questions like “language localization”, “lexical memory store”, or the 
linguistic “real estate of the brain” (Hoff 2004: 50). Exactly how language is imag-
ined spatially is another matter, and, rather predictably, a source of fundamental 
disagreements. Authors working in the nativist tradition claim that language is 
separate from other cognitive functions and it is itself subdivided into modules, 
a view most forcefully advocated by Fodor (1983) in his book The Modularity 
of Mind. For a long time, linguists assumed at least the binary partitioning of 
the language territory into the lexicon and syntax. But in recent years, the divi-
sion has been questioned, as in Culicover & Jackendoff (2005: 26), who claim 
that “the traditional distinction between lexicon and grammar is mistaken”. 
In Cognitive Linguistics, the view of separate grammar and lexicon has been 
replaced by a continuum, where the lexicon is seen as transitioning seamlessly 
into syntax. In Construction Grammar, the continuum area has come to be 
referred to as the “phrasicon” (Fillmore, Kay, & O’Connor 1988: 511), “expanded 
lexicon”, or “constructicon” (Goldberg 2006: 64), “a super lexicon encompassing 
not only single lexical items, but also multi-word expressions and partially filled 
phrases as well as completely schematic syntactic patterns” (Szcześniak 2016: 
121). All forms that are found to populate the constructicon are referred to as 
constructions, defined as “learned pairings of form with semantic or discourse 
function, including morphemes or words, idioms, partially lexically filled and 
fully general phrasal patterns” (Goldberg 2006: 5).
4.2 Relations between constructions
However, even though most cognitive linguists converge on the conclusion 
that knowledge consists in “the mental lexicon, idiom list, and grammar … 
represented as a uniform collection of grammatical constructions” (Jurafsky 
1996: 140) spread throughout the continuum, disagreements persist about the 
exact internal organization of the proposed continuum area. The main question 
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I wish to address here is whether constructions residing in the constructicon are 
interconnected or primarily independent. The interconnected network scenario 
is advocated by authors like Goldberg (2006), Trousdale (2015), or Perek (2016). 
Under this view, “Constructions are linked in a network and may capture gram-
matical patterns at any level of complexity and abstraction” (Perek 2016: 1). 
The opposing view, under which constructions are believed to be largely au-
tonomous is promoted by Bybee (2010) or Taylor (2012). Although Bybee (2010: 
25) herself uses the term “network of relations”, presupposing that constructions 
are linked together within the user’s cognitive representation of language, she 
qualifies this proposal and stresses that links between constructions “can be of 
varying strengths. Certain factors … are influential in the maintenance or loss 
of these lexical connections” (p. 25). Because the question of links between con-
structions is part of her exemplar model, a brief excursus on the model’s main 
assumptions is necessary here. Exemplars are defined as “rich memory repre-
sentations; they contain, at least potentially, all the information a language user 
can perceive in a linguistic experience” (Bybee 2010: 14). Exemplars are memory 
units corresponding directly to constructions, and indeed the two terms can 
be used largely interchangeably. However, apart from specifying constructions 
as pairings of form and function/meaning, exemplars are conceived of more 
directly as entries in the speaker’s mental representations, and the exemplar 
model strives to capture the psychological nature of such entries in the mind. 
Thus exemplars are hypothesized to accommodate information about contextual 
specifications, where 
This information consists of phonetic detail, including redundant and 
variable features, the lexical items and constructions used, the meaning, 
inferences made from this meaning and from the context, and properties of 
the social, physical and linguistic context (Bybee 2010: 14).
Bybee further claims that exemplars are subject to constant updates: “exemplars 
are considered to register details about linguistic experience” (p.14), a view e- 
choed in Taylor’s (2012: 3) mental corpus thesis, where “each linguistic encounter 
lays down a trace in memory. The trace pertains not only to the linguistic signal 
as such, but also to the context in which it is encountered”. In the same vein, 
both Taylor and Bybee stress “rich memory representations” (Bybee 2010:  31), 
where “the detail-rich and multi-dimensional representation applies to the 
structural, semantic, and discourse-related aspects of speech” (Taylor 2012: 286). 
The rationale here is that all that detail is directly relevant to usage; what the 
speaker knows about a given construction affects how she will use it.
The emphasis on detail-rich knowledge also explains why these authors 
downplay relations between constructions. Quite simply, from the user’s point 
of view, what matters is how a given construction is used, what communicative 
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function it fulfills, how appropriate or apt it is in a given context, and any infor-
mation in the service of efficient use, but crucially not what other constructions 
it may be related to. Even in the case of constructions that are closely linked, 
i.e. where one construction can be shown to originate from another, or to be its 
specific instantiation, any links between them are, according to Bybee, subject 
to gradual weakening and eventual dissolution. This can be illustrated on the 
example of expressions like take a break or pull strings. They form as independ-
ent exemplars through the process of chunking: “If two or more smaller chunks 
occur together with some degree of frequency, a larger chunk containing the 
smaller ones is formed” (Bybee 2010: 34). These expressions can be said to be 
specific instances of schematic transitive constructions v-np, and in the speaker’s 
mental representations, links can be hypothesized to hold between the chunked 
expression break a habit and its component words break and habit, as repre-













break a habit 
break 
habit 
Figure 4.1 Relations between a chunk and its component words
According to Bybee (2010: 48), complex chunks “maintain their internal struc-
ture and their relations with the other uses of their component parts” but these 
“complex units may become autonomous from their sources, losing both internal 
structure and transparent meaning”.
If true, attrition of interconnections between constructions may have pro-
found implications in terms of the range of phenomena that can be affected. It is 
not only chunks like break a habit that lose their association with the verb break; 
the same applies to special cases of schematic constructions involving concrete 
lexical insertions. For instance, the way construction can be assumed to reside 
in the speaker’s constructicon as a schematic form [v one’s way pp], and it can 
also be stored in lower-level formulaic chunks like [make your way pp] or even 
more substantively as [talk your way out of trouble]. The same is true of complex 
words like available which cease to be related to their etymological components 
avail and -able. Such weakening interconnections can be thought of as fading 
traces of a language form’s derivational history. If this fading mechanism is 
as pervasive as Bybee claims, the consequences for the overall picture may be 
rather dramatic, as a speaker may lose awareness of not only relations between 
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cognates (dear and dearth, warm and warmth) but also polysemous uses of the 
same word. This issue will be addressed in Section 4.4.
In what follows, I will focus on a fairly schematic pattern with a number of 
relatively autonomous lower-level instantiations that have developed based on 
the formula provided by the construction (coincidentally, the pattern in question 
has to do with the notion of place too, as it serves to express a salient property 
of a location being described in a sentence). After I have reviewed the form and 
use of this construction, I will return to the question of how best to imagine the 
arrangement of the contents of the constructicon. That is, the construction will 
serve as an opportunity to explore the issue of interconnections between related 
patterns, and I will argue that even assuming autonomy of emerging chunks, 
downplaying their links with the host pattern is not entirely justified.
4.3 The Characteristic-As-Place Construction
4.3.1 A form highlighting a salient characteristic
This section focuses on what can be termed the Characteristic-As-Place Con-
struction (CAP), analysed in more detail in Szcześniak (2019), exemplified by 
the sentences in (1). 
(1) a. Helen watched her nieces from the safety of her recliner. (Gin Jones, 
A Dose of Death)
b.  Lyn’s work continues in the comfort of the Arbor House Bed and Break-
fast. (Ray Madaghiele, Ray of Hope)
c.   Down below, we sit in the comfort of the gazeebo. (Marquis Heyer, Whis-
pers of the Poet)
d.  What you do in the privacy of your home is your business. (Hunter S. 
Thompson, Fear and Loathing in America)
e.  That evening, in Amsterdam, I sat in the peace of the lounge of a private 
hotel. (W. G. Sebald, The Rings of Saturn)
The above uses should be considered instantiations of a special construction. 
Phrases like from the safety of her recliner or in the privacy of your home are built 
around a clear pattern represented in (2), where npchar stands for a noun naming 
a characteristic of a location nploc, all normally preceded by a preposition nploc.
(2) p npchar of nploc 
The main purpose of the construction is to reify an abstract property of the 
location in question and make it look as if that property is an actual location.
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As a consequence, the subject of the sentence is construed as being in or moving 
through that materialized characteristic. This reframing of the characteristic as 
a location is a kind of mental transubstantiation that gives the construction its 
name. It must further be pointed out that the element of physical motion or 
location of the subject through the characteristic is crucial because it is what 
sets the construction apart from other syntactic patterns that also allow noun 
phrases preceded by prepositions:
(3) New York State continues to invest in the safety of the airport. (https://www.
governor.ny.gov)
In (3) too, the safety can be construed metaphorically as a location (in which 
investment is made), but the key word here is “metaphorically”. By contrast, the 
properties in (1) are viewed as if they are actual locations, in which people (or 
other concrete figures) can sit, from which people can watch something or in 
which anything can be done. In other words, the pattern triggers a semantic 
operation through which a characteristic materializes into a space metonymic 
with the location named by the noun following it. It can be speculated that the 
metaphoric construal of a property as a location, like in (3), served as a precursor 
for reified uses like those in (1), where a property is treated as a de facto location. 
And it can be further hypothesized that, at some point in the history of English, 
the shift from the metaphoric to the reified occurred (perhaps) through transi-
tional uses such as the example in (4), where the interpretation of the property is 
ambiguous between the two readings. 
(4) Sleep, O sleep in the calm of all calm,
Sleep, O sleep in the guidance of guidance,
Sleep, O sleep in the love of all loves
(Lines from The Death Dirge; a Gaelic prayer, author and date unknown)
And like a typical location noun, the characteristic NPchar can be preceded by 
a diverse range of prepositions found in descriptions of locations. A cursory 
glance at a number of examples of use is enough to conclude that probably any 
preposition is possible. The examples in (5) are a brief sample of both locative 
and motive prepositions.
(5) a. A person finds going out of the comfort of his or her own home agonizing. 
(Joc Anderson, The Author of Love)
b. He moved most of the guards back into the comfort of the buildings. 
(Michael Connelly, The Mortarmen)
c. …many of us have been discussing the Prophecy around the privacy of 
our camp fires for weeks now. (Sara Douglass, Enchanter)
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d. … he led a group of sailors and Basque fishermen inside the safety of 
Louisbourg. (Guy Wendell Hogue, Louisbourg)
e.  Women living in refuges have to be constantly vigilant when outside the 
safety of the refuge. (Lyn Shipway, Domestic Violence)
f.   A few metres above the safety of the new pathway, the sled hit a small 
outcrop of ice. (Lee F Herrick, The Foundation Vault)
Another hint that the pattern is a separate construction is that it is not avail-
able in some languages. For example, if translated verbatim from example (1e), 
the sentences in Czech1 (6) or Polish (7) are decidedly anomalous: 
(6) * Toho večera v Amsterdamu jsem seděl v klidu pohovky soukromého 
hotelu.
(7) * Tego wieczora w Amsterdamie siedziałem w spokoju salonu prywatnego 
hotelu. 
The CAP construction is highly productive. Although it can most typically 
be attested with only a handful of nominal insertions, of which by far the most 
common are privacy, comfort, safety, the construction can also feature other 
nouns, as in (8). Other nouns attested as insertions in the NPchar slot include 
tranquility, intimacy, familiarity, shelter, invulnerability and security.
(8) a. Nobody relaxes until we chug past the breakwater, and even slipping into 
the calm of the marina. (Charlotte Gill, Eating Dirt)
b. All too quickly we were transported from the serenity of the woods. 
(Michelle Pugh, Love at First Hike)
c. Mallous peered around in the quiet of the museum. (Philip M. LaVoie, 
Legacy of the Vampire)
4.3.2 Central exemplar meaning 
Of prime importance for the present study is the question of the semantics of 
the construction, because it is directly relevant to how various instances of the 
1 For the sake of accuracy, it should be pointed out that the question is more complex. Czech 
seems to allow at least some uses of the construction, and so for example, it is perfectly natural to 
say Helen pozorovala své neteře z bezpečí svého křesla or To, co děláš v soukromí svého domova, je 
tvoje věc (literal translations of 1a and 1d, respectively; Petra Novotná, p.c.), which suggests that 
the construction may be partially productive or that some of the nouns denoting characteristics 
have lexicalized additional locative senses. However, any discussion of the intricacies of such 
sentences in Czech would go far beyond the scope of this study, whose main focus is on the be-
haviour of the construction in English. 
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construction are mutually related. In the cognitive linguistic literature it is 
assumed that new uses of a given construction are created based on semantic 
similarity to the main (central) instances of an established exemplar. What then 
is the meaning of the CAP’s typical exemplars which can be assumed to be 
shared by most speakers? If uses like [p the safety of NPloc] or [p the comfort of 
nploc] can be treated as likely candidates for exemplars in the speaker’s mental 
representation of the construction, then most noun insertions found in the first 
segment of the [p NPchar of NPloc] frame convey readings synonymous with either 
‘comfort’ or ‘safety’. 
What could justify the characterization of the construction as an instrument 
for expressing ‘safety’, ‘privacy’ or ‘comfort’ is quite simply the evidently high 
frequency of its uses with the nouns safety, privacy and comfort, which constitute 
a great majority of all attestations. The remaining uses like those in (8) feature 
close synonyms most likely motivated by the correspondence with the two 
nouns, which function as benchmark representatives. At this point, it is tempt-
ing to conclude that the construction is strongly associated with the readings of 
‘safety’, ‘privacy’ or ‘comfort’ or even that these readings are the meaning of the 
construction. 
4.3.3 Less frequent interpretations 
However, the semantics of the construction is not confined to a simple cluster 
of synonyms. The meanings conveyed in (9) and (10) go beyond the readings of 
‘comfort’ and ‘safety’. Among other less typical insertions are quietude, excite-
ment, coolness, charm, and splendor.
 (9) a. They had slept each night, bent and knotted in the discomfort of the car 
seats, without undressing. (Newton G. Thomas, The Long Winter Ends)
b. In the summer months they ordinarily retreated to the cool of the Khan
  Khokhii Mountains. (Tim Cope, On the Trail of Genghis Khan)
(10) a. Hawke was able to lead them through the lower mountains and caverns 
and allow them to rest in the obscurity of the caverns. (Marleen Johnsen, 
Beaumount Treasure)
b. In the silences between thoughts, emotions or sensations, we rest in the 
enormity of the ocean. (Ayala Gill, Yoga as a Mindfulness Practice)
c. …the witch was a victim and died in the horror of the flames. (Roland 
Barthes, Michelet)
d. A huge gust hits the trees and Mara thinks of Rowan and all the others, 
starved, sick and dying in the misery of the boat camp ... (Julie Bertagna, 
Exodus)
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e. Inland a new generation of pioneers struggled in the austerity of the 
wilderness... (James David Hart, The Popular Book)
f. …to step into another world: from the hustle and bustle of an Alexan-
drian cult to the stillness of the Eastern deserts... (Phil Booth, Crisis of 
Empire)
While some of the less typical insertions can still be shown to allude to the 
semantics of ‘comfort’, as is the case with charm or discomfort, many other 
insertions (obscurity, hustle and bustle, austerity, horror) in (10) are hardly 
straightforward extensions of such a narrowly defined exemplar. What they 
share is a much more general sense of ‘defining characteristic or essence of the 
location described’.
Thus, exemplars, however frequent they may be, do not reveal the full mean-
ing of a construction. Instead, their detailed meanings are specific instances of 
the general and abstract meaning of the construction. It is the comprehensive 
scope of the general meaning ‘defining characteristic’ that makes room for uses 
of nouns like horror or enormity, which would not be possible if the construc-
tion’s meaning were confined to meanings of ‘comfort’ or ‘safety’.
4.4 The psychological reality of relatedness 
Based on the above observations of the CAP construction, I will now attempt to 
draw broader conclusions about the question of relatedness of forms within the 
constructicon. Bybee claims that when a construction gives rise to a substantive 
chunk, that chunk may acquire an increased degree of autonomy and gradually 
cease being associated with its mother pattern. This dissociationist view is in line 
with the more general cognitive linguistic rejection of derivations, under which 
constructions are not viewed as derivatives of other constructions (for example, 
the passive voice is argued to be independent from the active voice, despite 
Chomsky’s quite irresistible transformational analyses of the former as originat-
ing from the latter). Perhaps the most extreme version of the non-derivational 
view is found in Taylor (2012), who extends it to word senses:
Although the relatedness of two meanings might be apparent to the 
analysing linguist, it by no means follows that speakers of a language also 
perceive the different uses to be related. For the linguist, there might be 
compelling grounds to regard meaning B as an extension of meaning A; 
there might even be historical evidence for such a process. … The notion 
of one meaning being derived from, based on, or an extension of another 
meaning might not feature at all in the speaker’s mental representation of 
the word and how it is used (Taylor 2012: 229).
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Taylor’s argument is that the cognitive linguist’s prime ambition should be to 
account for the psychological reality of sense relatedness, and not to dwell on its 
historical record; what matters for language proficiency is how two given senses 
are used and not whether they are related. 
However, the conception of words in the mental lexicon being mutually 
disassociated does not sit well with the insights flowing from earlier traditional 
descriptions of the language system, even those that strive to capture the mental 
functioning of language. To take one obvious example, recall that Saussure ar-
gued that words determine their meanings through correspondences with their 
neighboring words, including antonyms, synonyms and cognates, just like the 
value of a five-franc coin is not fixed by “the metal in a piece of money” (Saus-
sure 1916: 118), but by its relation to other coins and their values:
…all words used to express related ideas limit each other reciprocally; 
synonyms like French redouter ‘dread,’ craindre ‘fear,’ and avoir peur ‘be 
afraid’ have value only through their opposition: if redouter did not exist, 
all its content would go to its competitors (Saussure 1916: 116).
In what follows I will argue that although the connections between language 
forms may be backgrounded and treated as secondary to the connections that 
these forms establish with their usage, it is nevertheless important to appreci-
ate the possibility that in the mind of the speaker, correspondences between 
words—as well as between chunks and their dominant patterns—do matter and 
it is impossible to rule out their existence. What prompts Taylor and others to 
question the significance of relations is considerations of use, but ironically it 
is precisely for reasons of use that it makes sense to hypothesize that speakers 
do consult them, at least subconsciously, if only to determine the meaning of 
a lexical item they are about to use.
4.4.1 Relations opaque to awareness 
First, before any other arguments are considered, it is perhaps necessary to 
point out that any discussions of the question are inevitably speculative. There is 
simply no way of knowing for sure whether two forms are related or completely 
independent in the speaker’s mind. However, any strong statements against 
relatedness should be hedged against obvious facts like the unconscious nature 
of what happens in the mind: “the lexicon and the rules of grammar are not 
accessible to awareness. Only their consequences, namely linguistic expressions, 
are consciously available” (Jackendoff 1997: 181). Ruling out any connections 
is surely more extreme and implausible than allowing the possibility that two 
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language forms may be linked mentally in one way or another, at least at a very 
unconscious level. This scenario is justified by the well-known observation that 
memory (especially long-term memory) is highly associative (Goldberg 1995: 
133). If anything, the mind is known to forge associative links rather than avoid 
them. In the case of linguistic associations, speakers often conjecture links be-
tween words, even if they need to double-check them for etymological accuracy. 
In fact, Taylor himself gives the example of people’s false beliefs about related-
ness of senses not justified by historical data:
Take, as an example, the word ball, in the meanings ‘spherical object’ and 
‘social event involving dancing’. Some people might see in the circular 
movement of the dancers or the circular shape of a dance floor a relation to 
the shape of a sphere; for these speakers, the word might count as polyse-
mous (Taylor 2012: 229).
That speakers entertain such connections is a symptom of a deeper tendency to 
link word senses (and by extension, words with their cognates, and larger con-
structions with their specific instances) into networks. Some evidence in favour 
of this associative tendency is available from psycholinguistic studies of parallel 
activation of multiple memory contents, to which I turn now.
4.4.2 Cross modal priming
Some support for the idea that multiple senses of a word are accessed in parallel 
comes from a lexical decision experiment by Swinney (1979), which showed that 
when faced with a polysemous word, speakers nevertheless consult even those 
senses that context should help eliminate. 
Swinney’s study investigated the activation of the senses of the polysemous 
word bug, whose meanings include ‘insect’, ‘error’ and ‘espionage device’. The 
design involved a lexical decision task where subjects were timed for their recog-
nition of the words ANT and SPY. Some of the subjects were first asked to read 
the following sentences: 
(11) Rumor had it that, for years, the government building had been plagued 
with problems. The man was not surprised when he found several spiders, 
roaches, and other bugs in the corner of his room.
The objective was to investigate whether the words ANT and SPY would be 
recognized faster during the lexical decision task as a result of the subject’s prior 
exposure to the word bug. Perhaps predictably, priming effects were observed for 
ANT, because the word bug in the priming sentence was used with the ‘insect’ 
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meaning, which is closely related to the word ant. But surprisingly, the reaction 
times for the word SPY also decreased, even though the context presented in the 
sentence did not justify the ‘espionage’ sense of bug:
not only are both (all) meanings for an ambiguity momentarily accessed, 
even in the presence of a strong biasing context, when the ambiguities are 
approximately balanced for most likely a priori interpretation …, but that 
all meanings are also immediately and momentarily accessed even when 
materials have a priori biases largely toward just one of the ‘senses’ of the 
word tested (Swinney 1979: 657).
4.4.3 Generalizations
Many recent studies treat productivity and creativity as a product of analogy. 
Specifically, new uses are argued to be motivated by analogy with existing ex-
pressions, and these new uses form “by replacing a constituent verb, adjective 
or preposition by a synonym or antonym” (Langlotz 2006: 274). To take a well-
known example, the drive adj construction can yield variants like drive someone 
nuts, insane, berserk etc. on analogy with the central chunk drive someone crazy 
(Bybee 2010: 81). In the case of the CAP construction too, most new uses can 
be explained by showing that new insertions are analogous to chunks like the 
comfort of your home. This chunk can serve as a model for the luxury of your 
home or the bliss of their sphere: 
(12) The Brahma gods are always affirming their identity and lingering in the 
bliss of their sphere. (Venerable Sucitto Bhikkhu, The Dawn of the Dhamma)
However, as was demonstrated in Section 4.3.3, many uses are hard to justify 
by analogy. Insertions like hustle and bustle, obscurity, or enormity are not syn-
onymous or antonymous with comfort or any of the typical insertions, and they 
share little, semantically speaking, with these model insertions.
A better alternative is to account for them as following a higher-level (more 
general) pattern (2), repeated here for convenience in (13). The significance of 
a more general formula is that the first np does not accommodate a synonym 
cluster centred around the meaning ‘comfort’, but allows nouns naming any 
characteristic of a location. 
(13) p npchar of nploc
That, however, requires the speaker exploiting a relation between known chunks 
(that serve as models) and the schematic pattern. This is another way of saying 
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that speakers can generalize from specific examples to more schematic catego-
ries. This possibility is contested in Bybee: “productivity (the ability to apply 
existing structure to new utterances) can be accomplished through local analo-
gies to existing exemplars, without reference to higher-level or more abstract 
generalizations” (Bybee 2010: 102). The problem is that the CAP (and many other 
constructions) can be shown to feature insertions that are not accomplished 
by straightforward local analogies to existing exemplars. They clearly rely on 
long-range analogies with schematic patterns of the type shown in (13), which 
suggests that speakers are aware of underlying relations involved. 
Now before the non-relational organization view is dismissed, it is fair to 
consider an alternative idea in its favour. One way of preserving the local-analo-
gies-only view would be to assume that in some cases exemplars serve as models 
for creative extensions, which can by definition be rather liberal. Such extensions 
go far beyond simple synonymy, as can be seen in numerous examples of meta-
phoric extensions identified in the cognitive linguistic literature. When a given 
lexical item is used with a metaphoric meaning, such as breeze in breeze through 
the task, the extension involves much more than simple synonymy. Here, the 
verb is interpreted as meaning something more elaborately removed from the 
literal ‘blow like a wind’. Advocates of non-relational accounts could argue that 
non-typical uses of the CAP are also extensions, and thus obviate the need for 
generalization relations with high-level schematic patterns. 
However, this argument only works if extensions are clearly motivated and 
share important points highlighted by the analogy applied. There is a lot of shared 
semantic content highlighted in the use of breeze with the meaning ‘proceed (in 
a task)’: the fact that the progress is as effortless as a breeze is light, or that in 
both cases considerable distance is covered. By contrast, the extensions found 
in the CAP construction share little with frequent exemplars. If anything, they 
represent dilutions of the semantics of low-level chunks, which is a signature 
feature of generalization, not of extension.
4.4.4 Inflation of disconnected chunks 
One final argument against overplaying the autonomy of language forms in the 
constructicon should become apparent when we follow the autonomy-above-
relatedness view to its logical conclusion. Chunking is a theoretically unlimited 
process. A given sequence can solidify into increasingly specific chunks by fus-
ing with other lexical material as illustrated in Figure 4.2 below.
It would be absurd to claim that a speaker who has incorporated a chunk 
(in stage 4) into his or her knowledge no longer sees any relation between this 
chunk and its preceding dominant (in stage 3). Similarly, it is quite beyond belief 
to assume that speakers are not aware of links between clearly and saliently 
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related words like whiten and white or speaker and speak. Admittedly, it makes 
perfect sense to assume that a chunk may be allotted its own separate entry 
in the lexicon and, through frequent repetition, be consolidated to be instantly 
accessible for the purposes of fluent and efficient use, but it is unclear why these 
steps of psychological entrenchment should somehow erase its relations to even 
the closest constructions.
Stage 1         in NPchar   of NPloc
Stage 2        in the comfort of NPloc
Stage 3        in the comfort of one’s home
Stage 4   sit in the comfort of one’s home
Figure 4.2 The chunking process yielding the low-level instantiation sit in the comfort of one’s 
home
4.5 Conclusions
This study has been concerned with the issue of internal relations within the 
constructicon. Specifically, the question has been whether language forms are 
interconnected in the speaker’s cognitive representations or, conversely, whether 
they should be treated as autonomous islands, mutually irrelevant and indif-
ferent. More broadly, the question concerns all items of linguistic knowledge, 
which include not only very general patterns, fixed expressions, or complex 
words, but also multiple senses of polysemous words. Does it make sense to 
hypothesize connections between the meanings of cut in cut the grass, cut the 
cloth and cut the salaries? Searle (1980: 221) and Taylor (2012: 226) answer in the 
negative. They claim that the speaker benefits from associating these senses with 
specific occasions of use, but not from linking them with one another. Similarly, 
are there mental connections between blockbuster and the component elements 
block and buster? Gentner and Bowdle (2008: 118) suggest that “most people are 
unaware of the original sense of blockbuster, namely, a bomb that can demolish 
an entire city block”. The emerging picture is one where the speaker’s knowledge 
may have little to do with the linguistic accounts of word formation which trace 
the mechanisms responsible for deriving new forms out of existing material. If 
it is true that the mental representations leave no place for interconnections be-
tween items of linguistic knowledge, we are faced with a paradoxical conclusion 
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that the enormous body of research amassed in fields like morphology, syntax, 
or historical linguistics may be little more than academic speculation, interest-
ing, well-intentioned and even impressively compelling, but ultimately divorced 
from concrete reality.
But this conclusion is obviously extreme, if not harshly unfair. True, many 
insights about the psychological status of derivational correspondences between 
words may be inevitably speculative, as no brain imaging technology available 
makes it possible to demonstrate the existence of polysemous links or connec-
tions between constructions and their concrete instantiations. However, denying 
internal relations in the lexicon is pure speculation too. And the problem is that 
doubts about interrelations are based primarily on personal introspection. When 
authors like Taylor express their skepticism, they invoke the speaker’s perspec-
tive, that is, their own private perspective, inspired by the irresistible impression 
of not paying attention to links between a given word being used and its cog-
nates. Of course, it is hard to argue with that; after all, in the act of language use, 
the speaker’s focus is on the communicative situation, and not on what might 
happen under the surface. But appeals to conscious monitoring is a dubious 
argument. By the same token, nobody is aware of the mental operations at work 
necessary to keep the balance while riding a bicycle, but that does not mean 
those operations do not take place. Explaining the mental reality of language 
knowledge and use by restricting one’s observations to what is readily visible 
has a suspiciously behaviourist ring to it, and although cognitive linguistics has 
developed a distrust of anything that resembles hidden derivations or invisible 
relations, its insistence on the surface form has limited explanatory potential. 
As Dixon (2010: 40) observed, one cannot understand language fully by only 
analysing “surface structure; this is rather like trying to assess the physical fit-
ness of an athlete from the clothes they wear”. 
Fortunately, our intuitions and hypotheses about the internal relations 
between language forms are not merely speculative. Even if we are far from 
being able to substantiate our claims by direct neurolinguistic evidence, we have 
enough clues gleaned from psycholinguistic studies (like the one summarized 
in Section 4.4.2) or from speakers’ creativity in using constructions with new 
vocabulary items. Using words in novel combinations would be impossible 
without long-distance analogies (requiring relations between diverse items in 
the constructicon) because not all experimental uses of a construction can be 
accounted for by reference to existing instances. In their semantics they go well 
beyond the familiar patterns dictated by memorized chunks. These facts justify 
the conjecture that constructional “network is made up of instances of use 
(constructs), and constructions of varying levels of generality and productivity” 
(Trousdale 2015: 21).
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